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Thesis Scope and Experimental Baseline

Research question: How do different voting rules influence the temporal evolution of participation rates and inequality in a simple multi-agent system with adaptive agents?

Related documents:

1. Scientific Scope

The thesis studies a fixed simulation environment where voting rule is the primary intentionally varied factor in rule-comparison runs.

Participation and altruism are adaptive, but their update mechanisms are fixed within a given experiment set.

2. Baseline Model Settings

Baseline family:

  • quality_target_mode = puzzle
  • participation_signal_mode = group_relative_delta_rel_party
  • altruism_mode = satisfaction

  • satisfaction-response parameters:

    • altruism_satisfaction_theta
    • altruism_satisfaction_slope
    • altruism_response_gamma

Implemented voting-rule mapping (rule_idx):

  • 0 = plurality
  • 1 = approval
  • 2 = utilitarian
  • 3 = borda
  • 4 = schulze
  • 5 = random

3. Rule-Family Framing for Thesis Inference

  • confirmatory canonical family: utilitarian (2), borda (3), schulze (4)
  • reference family: plurality (0), random (5)
  • context-only calibration arm: approval (1)

Family labels define reporting roles, not implementation differences in runtime mechanics.

4. Primary Outcomes

Primary outcome families are evaluated as time-series and run-level summaries:

  • participation dynamics (turnout)
  • resource inequality (gini_assets from steps.gini_index)
  • experiential inequality (gini_dissatisfaction from agents.dissatisfaction_value)
  • outcome-quality trajectory (quality_distance aggregated from area_steps with mode-aware source)

Interpretation note:

  • assets denotes simulation resource/capacity state, not necessarily currency.

5. Secondary Descriptive Analyses

Secondary (non-confirmatory) views include:

  • group-level turnout and participation-composition dynamics
  • participation/inequality co-movement patterns
  • benchmark-reference distance diagnostics from logged artifacts

6. Out of Scope for Confirmatory Claims

  • strategic voting equilibria
  • empirical calibration against real election datasets
  • normative policy prescriptions
  • claims of globally optimal democratic design