Thesis Scope and Experimental Baseline
Research question: How do different voting rules influence the temporal evolution of participation rates and inequality in a simple multi-agent system with adaptive agents?
Related documents:
- docs/research/thesis_measurement_spec.md
- docs/research/metric_glossary.md
- docs/research/thesis_model_concepts.md
1. Scientific Scope
The thesis studies a fixed simulation environment where voting rule is the primary intentionally varied factor in rule-comparison runs.
Participation and altruism are adaptive, but their update mechanisms are fixed within a given experiment set.
2. Baseline Model Settings
Baseline family:
quality_target_mode = puzzleparticipation_signal_mode = group_relative_delta_rel_party-
altruism_mode = satisfaction -
satisfaction-response parameters:
altruism_satisfaction_thetaaltruism_satisfaction_slopealtruism_response_gamma
Implemented voting-rule mapping (rule_idx):
0 = plurality1 = approval2 = utilitarian3 = borda4 = schulze5 = random
3. Rule-Family Framing for Thesis Inference
- confirmatory canonical family:
utilitarian (2),borda (3),schulze (4) - reference family:
plurality (0),random (5) - context-only calibration arm:
approval (1)
Family labels define reporting roles, not implementation differences in runtime mechanics.
4. Primary Outcomes
Primary outcome families are evaluated as time-series and run-level summaries:
- participation dynamics (
turnout) - resource inequality (
gini_assetsfromsteps.gini_index) - experiential inequality (
gini_dissatisfactionfromagents.dissatisfaction_value) - outcome-quality trajectory (
quality_distanceaggregated fromarea_stepswith mode-aware source)
Interpretation note:
assetsdenotes simulation resource/capacity state, not necessarily currency.
5. Secondary Descriptive Analyses
Secondary (non-confirmatory) views include:
- group-level turnout and participation-composition dynamics
- participation/inequality co-movement patterns
- benchmark-reference distance diagnostics from logged artifacts
6. Out of Scope for Confirmatory Claims
- strategic voting equilibria
- empirical calibration against real election datasets
- normative policy prescriptions
- claims of globally optimal democratic design